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On The Rise of Health Spending and Longevity
* 
 
We use a calibrated stochastic life-cycle model of endogenous health spending, asset 
accumulation and retirement to investigate the causes behind the increase in health spending 
and life expectancy over the period 1965-2005. We estimate that technological change along 
with the increase in the generosity of health insurance may explain independently 53% of the 
rise in health spending (insurance 29% and technology 24%) while income less than 10%. By 
simultaneously occurring over this period, these changes may have lead to a “synergy” or 
interaction effect which helps explain an additional 37% increase in health spending. We 
estimate that technological change, taking the form of increased productivity at an annual 
rate of 1.8%, explains 59% of the rise in life expectancy at age 50 over this period while 
insurance and income explain less than 10%. 
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According to a recent report from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO, 2008), per 
capita health spending in 2005 was 6 times what it was in 1965. As a fraction of per capita 
income, health spending in the U.S. has grown from 4% to 16%. Newhouse (1992) 
concludes that more than half, perhaps even 65%, of the change is probably attributable to 
technological change, with more generous health insurance and the growth in income 
accounting for at most one third of the rise in health spending.  
Over the same period, life expectancy has increased considerably, particularly among 
the elderly. In 2005, a 50 year old men could expect to live 28.9 years compared to 22.95 
in 1965. Cutler, Deaton and Lleras-Muney (2006) argue that technological change is the 
leading explanation for the increase in longevity since evidence from the Health Insurance 
Experiment (HIE, Manning et al., 1987) and other recent studies on the SES-health 
gradient (Adams et al., 2003; Smith, 2007) suggest that neither growth in income nor the 
spread of health insurance can explain changes in life expectancy of that magnitude.  
In a recent study, Hall and Jones (2007) show that one can generate the growth in 
health spending and the resulting change in life expectancy solely as a result of growth in 
income using a model of endogenous health spending (Grossman, 1972; Ehlrich and 
Chuma, 1990). Instead of modeling other changes simultaneously, Hall and Jones show 
that with reasonable parameter estimates and implied value of longevity gains, one can 
generate the rise in health spending and life expectancy, assuming it is an optimal response 
to the growth in income.      3 
We follow a similar modeling approach, generating health spending growth as an 
optimal response to changing circumstances.  We introduce in our framework health 
insurance and technological change as explicit possible competing alternatives to income 
growth. We calibrate a stochastic life-cycle model of endogenous health spending, asset 
accumulation and retirement with detailed modeling of health insurance, Social Security 
and taxation using micro-data from 2000 to 2005. Our calibration approach involves fitting 
life-cycle profiles of assets, medical expenditures, retirement and mortality. We also 
calibrate the parameters of the model such that behavioral responses to changes in health 
insurance and income are similar to those reported in the literature. We then perform 
counterfactual simulations where we first find the necessary productivity gains such that 
we reach 1965 health spending levels. We find that a 1.8% annual growth in productivity is 
necessary to achieve the 1965 health spending levels. Once we obtain simulated profiles 
for 1965, we introduce sequentially each of the competing explanations for the rise in 
health spending to understand their relative importance. We find that far from competing, 
these are reinforcing forces: as much as 37% of the overall increase in health spending is 
due to the fact that these occurred simultaneously. We get a somewhat different story when 
we study the factors jointly regarding the relative importance of each factor in 
independently explaining the rise in health spending. We find that the increase in health 
insurance copayment has been as important as technological change while growth in real 
income over this period explains at most 10% of the rise in spending. Moreover, we find 
that both income and health insurance copayments can only explain up to 10% of the rise 
in longevity while productivity gains from technology account for up to 60% of the gain in 
life expectancy.    4 
The relative importance of income in our study differs from Hall and Jones (2006) for 
two important reasons. First, Hall and Jones (2006) use real GNP per capita growth while 
we use real earnings growth, the first one being much larger over this period. For workers 
in our sample, most of the growth in real GNP was not reflected in earnings growth. The 
average worker saw a growth in earnings of roughly 25% over the period we cover 
compared to growth in GNP per capita nearing 200% between 1965 and 2005. Second, we 
obtain a lower income elasticity of medical care. Hall and Jones need an income elasticity 
of medical care close to 4 in order to explain, solely using income growth, that medical 
expenditures rose by 800% while GNP per capita rose by roughly 200% between 1950 and 
2000. Our estimate of the income elasticity (to a permanent change in income) is close to 
unity which is in line with the cross-national estimates from the literature and larger than 
those from the micro-literature (between 0.2 and 0.4) (see Newhouse, 1992). Hence, in our 
model income does not explain the rise in the share of health spending. Insurance and 
technology do, and income facilitates the spillover effect. 
In section 2 we present the model. Section 3 presents the data and the calibration. In 
section 4 we perform the counterfactual simulations. We conclude in section 5.   
2. Model 
 
We build a model where an agent makes decisions over the entire life-cycle 
regarding health spending, consumption and retirement. The agent faces health risk, job 
risk and insurance coverage risk (up to the age of Medicare eligibility). The framework is 
closest to the one considered by French and Jones (2007) with three important differences. 
First, we endogenize health spending. Health spending can affect health which in turn 
affects directly future health, utility and earnings. In that sense, our modeling of health   5 
spending is closest to the human capital framework of Grossman (1972).
2 Second, an 
important difference is that we do not allow for uncertainty in earnings and medical 
expenditures given health, job and insurance status. Once medical expenditures are 
endogenous, there is little reason to think of the realization of health spending as stochastic 
conditional on a given health insurance, job and health status. In fact, they are assumed 
stochastic, ex ante, as the individual does not know yet his health, job and health insurance 
status. Finally, another important difference is that we assume labor supply is inelastic up 
before the agent chooses the age of retirement and that retirement is an absorbing state. We 
do this because labor supply plays a secondary role in our analysis.  
2.1.  Decisions and Preferences 
 
The agent makes decisions from age  0,..., t t T =  and dies with certainty at age. In other 
words, the terminal age   T  is the limit on human life. At each age t, we assume the agent 




t). She chooses non-medical expenditures   c
t , medical 
expenditures   m
t  and her retirement status   r
t . If she retires, let      r
t = 1 and      r
t = 0 if not. 
For our purposes, we will assume retirement is an absorbing state and is possible after age 
54. At age 70, we assume everyone is retired (few in the data work beyond that age). At 
age t, she has a health state   h
t  assumed to take 6 values {0,1,2,3,4,5} where zero denotes 
death and values 1 to 5 denote the self-reported health status scale {poor, fair, good, very 
good, excellent}. We assume preferences are represented by the following utility function 
                                                 
2 Other studies investigating endogeneous health investment include Blau and Gilleskie (2008), Galama et al. 
(2008), Khwaja (2009), Yogo (2009), Bajari, Hong and Khwaja (2009), Halliday, He and Zhang (2009), 
Juergen and Tran (2007), Suen (2009)   6 
 













t .  (1) 
The parameter     captures the degree of relative risk aversion,     
h  measures the direct 
utility of good health where 




3  Finally       
0, 
t  control the direct utility of 
leisure in retirement, which may vary with age.  
  We assume she has a bequest motive. When she dies at age t, she leaves a bequest 
in terms of accumulated assets,  t a , which give utility  
  ( ) log( ) t b t b a a   = .  (2) 
We assume that the bequest function is logarithmic and the parameter  b    measures the 
strength of the bequest motive.   
2.2.  Assets 
 
At each age, the agent can decide to forgo consumption and invest instead in a composite 
asset  t a  with annual return   . We specify a life-time budget constraint following Hubbard, 
Skinner and Zeldes (1995). At each age, cash-on-hand,  t x , is the sum of last-period assets 
t a  and total net income  t y  (including asset income) while total expenditures is the sum of 
non-medical expenditures and out-of-pocket medical expenditures  t oop (more detail is 
provided in section 2.5). We assume assets must be non-negative at all ages (the agent 
cannot borrow, particularly against pension wealth). End of period assets  1 t a +  are defined 
as 






t+1   0 for all t .  (3) 
                                                 
3 For simplicity, we assume being in excellent, very good and good health yields the same utility.    7 
Government transfers are given by  min max( ,0) t t tr c x =    where  min c  is a minimum 
consumption level guaranteed by the existence of substance programs such as, temporary 
assistance for needy families (TANF), food stamps, housing benefit and Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI).  
2.3.  Income and Pensions 
 
An agent’s total net income is given by  
 
  ( , , , )
e s o
t t t t t y tax y y y a   =   (4) 
 
where  () tax is a tax function that depends on annual earnings 
e
t y , social security benefits 
s
t y  , other (spouse) income 
o
t y  and asset income  t a   .  
 
Earnings - Earnings are assumed deterministic, conditional on age, employment and 
health status. If the individual is employed, we specify the log earnings equation as 
 
       
logy
t
e =  
0 +  
1t +  
2t
2 +  
3,sh
t,s s=2
5     (5) 
 
where  , ( ) t s t h I h s = = . Note that future earnings are uncertain due to uncertainty in health 
and employment. If unemployed or retired, earnings are zero. 
 
Retirement Income - Prior to the age of 62, individuals do not receive retirement 
income if they decide to retire. They finance consumption through their accumulated 
savings until they reach the age of 62. After the age of 62, they are assumed to be eligible 
for Social Security at which point they can start receiving benefits if they retire. As for 
those who elect not to retire prior to 62, they can delay retiring/claiming Social Security   8 
until they reach the age of 70 at which point everyone is assumed to retire (and claim). 
Social Security benefits are a function of lifetime earnings and the age of retirement. The 
measure of lifetime earnings used is the average indexed monthly earnings (AIME) 
denoted t ae , which represents the average of the 35 highest years of earnings. Before 
retirement, we approximate the evolution of AIME using the function 
  1 ( , , )
e
t t t ae G ae y t + =   (7) 
where  () G  is an age-specific non-linear regression of next period  1 t ae +  on current  t ae   and 
earnings, 
e
t y . This function is estimated on Social Security earnings records from the 
Health and Retirement Study (section 3.1.1).
4 To calculate Social Security benefits at the 
normal or full retirement age (NRA), one simply translates the AIME into the Primary 
Insurance Amount (PIA) by applying a concave function which is piece-wise linear. If the 
individual retires prior to the NRA, his benefit is reduced by an actuarial adjustment factor 
(arf). The same holds if the individual retires beyond the NRA. We follow French (2005) 
and compute, at the time where someone claims, a new AIME such that 
 
* ( ) ( ) ( ) t t pia ae arf t pia ae =   (6) 
holds. The new AIME is then kept permanently until death. Social Security benefits are 
then given by 
* ( )
s
t t y pia ae =  once an individual has claimed. 
Other Income – Other income is composed of the spouse’s income. It is assumed to be a 
function of age and earnings,  ( , )
o e
t t y o t y = .  
   
                                                 
4 The approximation performs well in practice. The main advantage is that we avoid having to include the 
entire earnings history in the state-space (French 2005).   9 
2.4.  Health  
 
An individual’s future health status is modeled as a dynamic ordered response process, 
which depends on current health status, medical expenditure, through a health investment 
function, and age. We first discuss the health investment function and then discuss the 
dynamic health process. 
 
Health Investment – There is little guidance from the literature on the form of the health 
investment function. As Elrich and Chuma (1990) argue, a function featuring diminishing 















  +  
=
 
.  (8) 
The elasticity of this function with respect to medical expenditures is negative and 
decreases with  t m  if  1 1   > . As Hall and Jones (2006) show, the rate at which the 
elasticity of the health production function to medical expenditures decreases is directly 
related to the responsiveness of the optimal investment to income changes. Intuitively, 
with constant life-cycle consumption and mortality rate, an additional dollar spent on 
health care is more valuable if the life extension it buys is valued more than the utility 
today from spending that dollar on consumption. The more concave the utility function is 
relative to the production function, the more valuable is the dollar spent on health. Hall and 
Jones (2006) consider a constant elasticity production function. We use a more flexible 
form in order to have additional degrees of freedom when fitting to the data. 
The productivity term is given by 
00 0 , 3 0
0( , ) e
h t t h t
t h t
       
< + + = . We allow the 
productivity term to increase in bad health (fair and poor) and to increase with age. We   10 
interpret the age coefficient in the productivity term as an interaction between depreciation 
and productivity. As the body depreciates, there is more that technology can do to “restore” 
health. At high levels of health and younger ages, there is less knowledge in the medical 
field how to protect the body against rapid depreciation.  
Health Process - Define next period’s health index as 
 
       
h
t+1





t = h)+  
t h=2
5     (10) 
where  a   is a standard normal health shock and  0( ) t    is a 4
th order polynomial in age. The 
latent health index is transformed into health status through the following rule, 
 
*
1   if   , 0,...,5 t h t h h h h h       =   < = . 
where { }
1,...,5 h h  
= is a set of thresholds. Because of the normal error assumption, this defines 
a dynamic ordered probit process.  
 
2.5.  Employment and Health Insurance 
 
Employment and health insurance are stochastic and out of the control of the agent. We 
assume  that  four  states  are  possible:  employed/unemployed  with  or  without  health 
insurance.  The states are defined as  {0,1,2,3} t e = where zero is unemployed without 
insurance, 1 is unemployed with health insurance, 2 is employed without health insurance 
and 3 is employed with insurance. We assume the probabilities of transiting from one state 
to the next are first-order Markov and depend only on age.  Upon retirement, the agents 
who had insurance coverage on their job retain it while those without have to wait until 
they become Medicare eligible. If the individual has health insurance ( 1,3 t e = ), we use a 
standard health insurance contract with a deductible and co-insurance rate to transform 
total into out-pocket expenditures.    11 
Hence, we assume the availability of retiree health insurance for those with insurance on 
the job at the time of retirement.
5 
Out-of-pocket medical expenditures when the agent is not Medicare eligible are 
given by 




















                            
  (11) 
where  1, 2, ( , ) t t µ µ  are the corresponding deductible and co-insurance rate respectively if 
covered at age t.  If Medical eligible (age 65 and older), we use a similar insurance 
contract as when  1,3 t e = . Because we follow annual medical expenditures and not doctor 
visits and hospital stays it is impossible to incorporate payment rules under Medicare Part 
A other than through an approximation.
6 But Medicare Part B coverage which covers 
outpatient procedures is very similar to the median employer provided health insurance 
contract. We provide more details in section 3.2.  
2.6.  Solution of the Dynamic Problem 
 
The agent maximizes the discounted sum of utility flows using a discount factor  . At each 
age, the agent can choose  t d  from a set of possible decisions  ( ) t D s  given the state space 
1 ( , , , , , ) t t t t t t s t e h r a ae   = .  The indirect utility of the agent at age t is written as  
                                                 
5 See French and Jones (2007) and Blau and Gilleskie (2008) for models where retiree health insurance is 
also stochastic. Both of these studies take insurance as given and out of the control of the individual (except 
for the fact that the individual can change/quit a job with insurance). Marquis and Long (1995) analyze the 
price and income responsiveness of the demand for health insurance in the non-group market. They find a 
price (premium) elasticity of -0.3 to -0.4 and an income elasticity of 0.1. See Bajari, Hong and Khwaja 
(2009) for a study looking at health insurance decisions in a life-cycle framework. 
6 See Blau and Gilleskie (2008) for a model where doctor visits rather than medical expenditures are 
modeled.   12 
       
v(s
t) = max
dt  D(st )
u(d














t+1)]          (12) 
where  ( , ) h t t p s m  denotes the probability of being in state  1 t h h + =  at age  1 t +  and  ( ) e t p s  
denotes the probability of employment/health insurance status. Equation (12) is subject to 
preferences and constraints from (1) to (11). 
This problem can be solved for the optimal solution: 
0
* *
,...., [ ( ), ( )] t t t t T d s v s =  by 
backward recursion. We assume a terminal age of 105 and a starting age of 25. We assume 
everyone who is still alive at age 105 dies. The currency used throughout is thousands of 
$USD 2004.  We provide details on the solution method in the Technical appendix.  
2.7.  Simulation 
 
We simulate the life-cycle trajectories of 1,500 hypothetical individuals starting at age 
0 t =25 by first drawing initial conditions from the joint distribution of AIME, assets and 
health in the data (see section 3.3). We then apply the decision rules and update the state-
space at each age until individuals reach age 105 (or die). We draw health and 
employment/health insurance shocks from their respective distributions. Since the state at 
each age might not fall on the grid, we use linear interpolation for consumption, medical 
expenditure and retirement decisions. 
3. Data and Calibration 
 
We focus on describing the behavior of a relatively homogeneous group because the model 
allows for limited heterogeneity. We chose to calibrate the model so that it matches the 
behavior of non-hispanic white men without a college education. We could not find   13 
evidence that growth in health spending or life expectancy has been different across socio-
demographic groups. Many studies document preference heterogeneity across groups and 
growth in income has been very different for college graduates relative to the rest of the 
population.   
     We use three main sources of data. The first is the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID), which we use for labor force and insurance status, health status, 
earnings and assets from age 25 till death. The PSID has information on medical 
expenditures at the household level. A second and more adequate source of data on 
individual medical expenditures is the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) for the 
years 2000 to 2003. Finally, we use the HRS for two purposes. First, we use Social 
Security earnings records of respondents to the Health and Retirement Study to estimate 
the relationship between AIME and earnings as described in equation (7). Second, the 
PSID seriously underestimates mortality in old age and has sparse cell counts over age 80. 
Hence, we use health status (which includes mortality) of respondents over age 50 from the 
HRS. Since cohort effects may exist, we select where possible data from the cohort born 
between 1936 to 1940 which is of retirement age (age 60 to 64) in the year 2000. 
We use self-reported health as our measure of health. Although we are aware that it 
is an imperfect measure of health, there are no other categorical measure that provide an all 
encompassing measure of health over the life-cycle. We reverse the original scale so that 1 
equals poor health and 5 excellent health. Furthermore, we add the category 0 which is 
defined as death. Death is inferred from exit interviews in the HRS and PSID as well as a 
matching procedure to the National Death Records for HRS respondents.   14 
We first discuss the estimation of auxiliary processes used in solving the model, 
such as the earnings, other income, AIME, employment/health insurance and finally health 
processes. We then follow with institutional details such as taxes, computation of Social 
Security benefits and health insurance premiums and co-insurance levels. We then discuss 
how initial conditions are drawn (the initial distribution of individuals at age 25). Finally, 
we discuss the estimation of profiles from the data used to calibrate parameters. This 
allows us to pin down a configuration of structural parameters matching the data.  
3.1.  Auxiliary Processes 
 
3.1.1.  Earnings, AIME and Other Income 
 
We estimate the earnings profile from the PSID using waves from 1980 to 2005. We use 
the sample of respondents aged 21 to 70 with positive earnings. After deletion of extreme 
cases, this leaves records on 3714 respondents with on average 6.4 observations per 
respondent.
7 We use log earnings as the dependent variables and control a quadratic in age, 
indicators for health states (2 to 5) and fixed effects. Upon estimation, we use the average 
of the fixed effects for the 1940 cohort to trace out the earnings profile. Estimates are 
reported below along with standard errors (in parenthesis). 
2
,2 (0.226) (0.009) (0.001) (0.035)
,3 ,4 ,5 (0.036) (0.037) (0.037)





y t t h
h h h
= +   +
+ + +
  (13) 
Our estimates report a substantial penalty from being in poor health ( 1 t h = ) 
relative to other health states. Relative to being in poor health, being in fair health is 
                                                 
7 We drop observations with earnings larger than $200 thousand per year and less than $5 thousands.    15 
associated with a 9.8% increase in earnings, being in good health 14% and being in 
excellent health 15.8%. The estimated earnings profile peaks at age 46 with average 
earnings of just over $32 thousand dollars. 
The average indexed monthly earnings is the average of the highest 35 years of 
earnings where each year of earnings is indexed to age 60 wage levels using the National 
Wage Index. We use earnings histories to estimate that process. The process for AIME is 
estimated from Health and Retirement Study Data merged with Social Security earnings 
histories. We use data from those born between 1936 and 1940. We postulate the following 
age-specific log-log regression:  
  0 1 2 3 1 log ( 0) log log
e e
t t t t t t t t t ae I y y ae             = + > + + +   (14) 
 
where  t    is a prediction error. We construct the AIME on the left-hand side using the 
computed AIME from earnings histories (35 highest years) and regress on current 
earnings, whether earnings are greater than zero. The R-square from such regressions 
comes close to 0.99 for most ages. The coefficients at each age are displayed in the 
Technical appendix.  
We estimate the process for other income using the 1980 to 2005 waves of the PSID. Other 
income is defined as spousal income. We estimated the following median regression 
 
   
Q0.5(yt
o |t,yt













e > 0)  (15) 
 
which yields an age profile peaking at age 44 with a value of $11.51.  
 
3.1.2.  Employment and Insurance Transition Probabilities 
 
We use the 1999 to 2005 waves of the PSID to estimate employment and insurance 
probabilities. We define a non-employment as being unemployed and drop observations   16 
where respondents do not participate in the labor force.. We define someone as insured 
(prior to Medicare eligibility) if he is either covered by employer provided health insurance 
(own or through spouse) or private insurance. Figure 1a reports the fraction in each state as 
a function of age. On average 17.9% of those aged 25 to 64 do not have health insurance. 
The fraction of uninsured workers steadily decreases with age until age 50 and then 
increases slightly. A small fraction, 3.2%, are unemployed. The fraction of unemployed 
decreases slightly with age. 
We estimate two-year transition probabilities as a function of age and the origin 
state using a multinomial logit model. The probability of transition to each of the four 
states is defined by 
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.  (16) 
  These are estimated using the sample of respondents age 25-64. We compute annual 
transition probabilities by taking the square root of the biennial transition matrix at each 
age.  
3.1.3.  Health Process 
 
To estimate the health process, we ideally need panel data on both health and individual 
level medical expenditures. MEPS is a short panel (on average 2 years) that does not allow 
to estimate annual transition probabilities across health states reliably. On the other hand, 
the PSID does not have individual level data on medical expenditures (only at the 
household level). Finally, the PSID does not capture mortality well, particularly in old age. 
The HRS provides better coverage in old age but lacks data on the population younger than   17 
50 and has very noisy medical expenditure data compared to the MEPS. Our strategy is to 
combine all three data sources for the purpose of calibrating the health process. Self-
reported health is defined in the same way in all three surveys. Hence, we resort to the 
following strategy: 
•  Estimate the distribution of medical expenditures as a function of self-reported 
health status and age in the MEPS. We assume the distribution has two-parts, first 
whether expenditures are positive or not and then log normally distributed when 
positive. We keep both the fraction of positives, mean and variance of the log 
normal distribution conditional on having positive expenditures for each age and 
health state. 
•  Pool together both PSID data for those age <50 (waves 1999 to 2005) and HRS 
data for those age >50 (waves 1992 to 2006).  The distribution of self-reported 
health is remarkably similar at the cutoff ages of 50 as can be seen from Figure 1b. 
•  Estimate parameters of the health process (  ) other than those of the investment 
function (  ) by maximizing the following likelihood: 
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  (17) 
 
where the probabilities  , ( , , ; ) h x i it it p t h m    are ordered probit probabilities for observing in 
dataset x  an individual at age  1 t +  in state  , 1 i t h h + =  given age, current health status, 
medical expenditures and conditional on the productivity parameters   . The integrals are 
evaluated using simulation by drawing from the distribution of medical expenditures in the   18 
MEPS. We use 25 draws per respondent/wave. The resulting maximum simulated 
likelihood estimator  ˆ( )      provides us with a calibration that fits the health process given a 
choice of productivity parameters. We perform this conditional procedure because we 
calibrate    using other moments from the data. Based on various diagnostic tests, it 
became apparent that the age-invariant assumption on the thresholds of the dynamic 
ordered model was too restrictive, particularly for mortality ( 0 it h = ). Hence, we allowed 
the threshold defining the upper bound for mortality to depend on a fourth order 
polynomial in age. 
3.2.  Institutional Details 
 
There are three important institutions represented in the model. First, there is the income 
tax schedule. Second, the Social Security benefit calculation formula and finally the 
Medicare and Non-Medicare health insurance out-of-pocket schedule.  
We use the 2001 Tax function taking into account Federal taxes and Social Security 
& Medicare taxes. We allow for basic deduction in couples and the personal exemption. 
Prior to age 65, the deduction is $7.6 and after 65 it is $9.65. We account for the partial tax 
treatment of Social Security benefits by taxing only 50% of Social Security benefits. 
Social Security benefits are basically a function of three factors: a measure of 
average earnings (AIME), birth year, and age at which benefits are first drawn. For our 
purposes, the Social Security earnings test is irrelevant since we assume individuals 
withdraw from the labor force at the time where they claim benefits. Furthermore, we 
model spouse benefits through other income such that the other spouse's receipt of Social 
Security does not play a distinct role. We assume individuals are born between 1936 and   19 
1940 and that their Normal Retirement Age (NRA) is 65 years of age (in reality it was 65 
for those born in 1936 and 65 and 6 months for those born in 1940).  To calculate the 
monthly benefit, the AIME is transformed into the Primary Insurance Amount (PIA). The 
PIA is a piece-wise linear concave function of the AIME. The PIA is the benefit that would 
be paid if claimed at the NRA. If the individual claims prior to the NRA, the PIA is 
reduced by 7.6%. Similarly, an individual can claim his benefit past the NRA in which 
case a delayed retirement credit (DRC) is granted. The credit is 6.5% for those born in 
1938 (6% for those born in 1936 and 7% for those born in 1940). Upon reaching 70, there 
is no DRC applied.  
For those younger than 65 and insured, we use data reported by Blau and Gilleskie 
(2008) from the Health Insurance and Pension Provider Survey (HIPPS). The median 
deductible is found to be $0.2 and the median co-insurance rate is 20%.  The median 
premium is $0.48. We do not impose a stop-loss on the insurance contract (maximum out-
of-pocket). Since there is no direct cost to investing in health, individuals in the model who 
desire to spend slightly more than the stop-loss would then consume an infinite amount of 
care.  
Establishing an overall co-insurance rate and deductible for Medicare is more 
complicated. Only Medicare Part B, which covers outpatient treatments, has a common 
deductible-coinsurance structure (part D was not in place for those respondents at the 
time). There is no premium for part A and the cost-sharing schedule depends on hospital 
stays, which we do not model. The premium for Medicare part B is $0.49 per year, the 
deductible $0.2 and the co-insurance rate 0.2 (20%). Hence, we choose to simply use the 
same price schedule for Medicare and Non-Medicare insurance. Therefore, within the   20 
context of our model, there is very little difference in coverage prior and after Medicare 
eligibility for those insured. The main difference is the uncertainty in insurance coverage. 
We applied the insurance parameters to total medical expenditures and compared 
with actual out-of-pocket expenditures reported in MEPS. At the mean, the computed out-
of-pocket expenditures are very similar to those from the data, both before and after the 
age of Medicare eligibility. 
3.3.  Initial Conditions 
 
We draw initial conditions for assets, AIME, insurance coverage and health status from the 
empirical distribution in the PSID data at age 25 (we use age 24 to 28 to boost the sample 
and replicate observations using frequency weights).  However AIME is not measured in 
the PSID. Since AIME is very close to earnings for those respondents (they have little 
labor market experience) we apply the following procedure. We first compute someone’s 
percentile in the earnings distribution at age 25. We then attribute the AIME of someone in 
the same percentile of the earnings distribution from the HRS restricted SSA earnings 
records. This imputation procedure preserves the correlation between earnings and other 
outcomes (assets, insurance coverage and health status).  
3.4.  Moments 
 
To calibrate the model, we use four sets of moments. First, we use median assets by age 
from the PSID. Second, we use retirement hazard rates by age from the Health and 
Retirement Study. Third, we use average medical expenditures by age from the MEPS. 
Fourth, we use mortality rates from ages 50 to 100 computed from the Health and   21 
Retirement Study. We discuss the construction of those moments below. Figure 2 reports 
estimates of those moments by age. 
3.4.1.  Assets 
 
We estimate a median asset age-profile using the PSID following the methodology of 
French (2005). Assets include all real and financial assets minus debt. We express all 
monetary amounts in $2004 and discard observations with assets larger than $1e+06. We 
estimate a median regression model of the form 
0.5 0 ( | , , ) t t cohort Q a t cohort hhsize hhsize         = + + +  
where  t    are age fixed effects. We also control for 5-year cohort fixed effects ( cohort   ) and 
household size ( a hhsize ). Upon estimation we predict for household size of 3 born between 




Retirement is a complex state to measure. First, some workers return to work after 
prolonged periods of inactivity in old age while not considering themselves retired. 
Second, some workers work while claiming Social Security benefits. Since our model 
considers a simplified definition of retirement, it is not clear which concept should be used. 
We elected to use self-reports of respondents on whether they are retired in the HRS.  We 
exclude as retired those who report being retired but are still at work. We use the 
retirement ages from the cohort born between 1931 and 1941 which has almost entirely   22 
retired by 2004. We find peaks in the retirement hazard at age 62 and 65 which are 
respectively the ages of early and normal retirement age under Social Security. 
3.4.3.  Medical Expenditures 
 
We use median total medical expenditures from the 2000 to 2003 waves of the MEPS. 
These expenditures include in-patient and out-patient expenditures as well as drug 
expenditures. They do not however include nursing home expenditures. To be consistent 
with other monetary flows in the model, we express those in $2004 dollars using the CPI. 
Not surprisingly, medical expenditures increase steadily with age.  
3.4.4.  Mortality 
 
We use the mortality profile from the Health and Retirement Study (older than 50) rather 
than from official life tables because we are looking at a specific sub-population (non-
hispanic white men with high school or less education). We express biannual rates into 
annual ones assuming a constant hazard within each age interval. Even with large samples, 
the mortality rates at older ages are quite volatile as can be seen from Figure 3. Smoothing 
these mortality rates (using a quadratic in log mortality rates) and computing a life-table 
yields remaining life expectancy of 47.3 years at age 25 and 26.9 years at age 50. We also 
report the mortality rates for men in 2002. White males without college education have 
slightly lower life expectancy than average males. Life expectancy at age 25 according to 
the life table is 49.2 years and 27.6 at age 50.    23 
3.5.  Calibration  
3.5.1 Preferences and Production Function 
In principle, we can estimate all structural parameters of the model using a method of 
simulated moments approach. For this paper, we have instead used a calibration approach, 
which consist of choosing manually parameters such that the fit of the moments is 
satisfactory for our purposes. However, we wish to emphasize that there is no way for us to 
claim that this is the unique and optimal set of parameter estimates for this model. There 
might well be other parameters that provide an equally (or even better) fit of the model. In 
choosing these parameters, we have borrowed partly from the literature on consumption 
and labor supply. We should note that no estimates of parameter values exist for a model 
that simultaneously features endogenous health spending, savings and retirement. Table 1 
provides the values of the parameters we have chosen. 
  Estimates of risk aversion vary substantially across studies. Studies using linearized 
Euler equations and consumption data tend to estimate risk aversion parameters in the 
range 1.5 to 2.5 (Attanasio and Weber, 1995). Estimates based on asset data tend to be 
much larger. Cagetti (2003) estimates on PSID data risk aversion parameters ranging from 
2.7 to 4.3. Recent estimates by French (2005), French and Jones (2007) and De Nardi, 
French and Jones (2006) suggest a risk aversion coefficient in the range 3-7. Each of these 
models are different and the estimate of risk aversion can be very sensitive to the amount 
of risk assumed, the sample used (elderly vs. young), the extent of liquidity constraints and 
the presence of a consumption floor. One of the reasons for the larger values in these 
recent studies is the role played by the consumption floor in depressing savings (Hubbard, 
Skinner and Zeldes, 1995). Hence, a larger value of risk aversion is needed to rationalize 
savings when there is a consumption floor. We chose a value of 2.6 for risk aversion. We   24 
fix the consumption floor at $3000 following the argument that few of the social programs 
in place apply to married men (accounting for 85% of the sample) and that take-up of those 
problems is generally well below 50% (De Nardi, French and Jones, 2006).  
  The real rate of return is set to 3%. There is considerable heterogeneity in estimates 
of the discount rate. Some studies find very low values, even negative [-0.04, -0.02] (Hurd, 
1989; French, 2005) while others find relatively larger values [0.04 to 0.07] (Gourinchas 
and Parker, 2002; Cagetti, 2003; De Nardi, French and Jones, 2006). We use a value of 
0.05. Hence, individuals can be characterized as relatively impatient and precautionary 
savings play an important role in consumption decisions. We impose a relatively strong 
bequest motive in order to rationalize the high level of assets in old age (relative to annuity 
income). The value of  b    is set to 0.05.  
  Next, we pin down retirement by choosing the marginal utility of leisure. We select 
values such that they capture the distribution of retirement ages and a median retirement 
age of 63.5 years.  
  Finally, we calibrate the health production function and disutility/utility of poor 
health status. We use the average medical expenditure profile, which rises almost linearly 
with age. This, along with the life-cycle path of health and mortality informs on the 
productivity of medical care.
8 We find that low values of productivity are necessary to 
rationalize why individuals spend so little on their health at earlier ages given the 
potentially important returns in terms of wages and consumption benefits. Without an age 
adjustment, the medical expenditure profile is much flatter as we cannot rationalize why 
                                                 
8 Trivially, at zero productivity, there are no simulated medical expenditures. Increasing the productivity will 
lift the simulated medical expenditure profile. But if the simulated profile is below the true profile, mortality 
will be over-estimated and vice versa if productivity is “too high”. Because the depreciation adjustment is 
with respect to the actual medical expenditure profile, it is not until the actual and simulated profile are close 
that mortality will be matched.    25 
agents delay health investments until old age. Given that the health production function is 
concave, there is an incentive to smooth health investment over the life-cycle.  We 
calibrate the age-related increase in productivity so that we match the medical expenditure 
profile. The increase in productivity due to poor/fair health is calibrated by making use of 
the differences in health expenditures by health status. Total medical expenditures are 8 
times larger for those in poor health than those in excellent health in the MEPS. Without 
the health related productivity parameter, we can only generate a factor of 5.  
We use a second piece of information to calibrate the health production function, in 
particular its curvature.  We show in the technical appendix, using a simplified version of 
the Hall and Jones (2007) model, that both price and income elasticities depend on the 
curvature of the health production function. The intuition is that in a health production 
model, the rate at which the marginal product of medical expenditure relative to the 
marginal utility of consumption increases as income or price increases is directly related to 
the value of life extension and therefore to the demand for health.  
Hence, we calibrate the health production function parameter so that it replicates 
roughly, among those of working age, the price (co-insurance) and income elasticity found 
in the literature. The co-insurance elasticity tends to fall between -0.1 and -0.4 depending 
on the type of services (preventive vs. curative and in-patient vs. out-patient) (Ringel et al., 
2000). Estimates from the Health Insurance Experiment (HIE) (Manning et al., 1987) 
yields an estimate around between -0.17 and -0.22 which varies across co-insurance rates 
and is slightly larger for preventive care (-0.17 to -0.43). For calibration, we consider a 
change from a co-insurance rate of 0.2 to 0.5 and calculate the resulting change in medical 
expenditures.    26 
As for the income elasticity, cross-sectional studies tend to obtain estimates in the 
range of 0.2 to 0.4 while studies using cross-country or time-series variation find an 
income elasticity close to unity. Cross-sectional studies face the problem of measurement 
error and reverse causality. Income is in part determined by health and other common 
factors, such that regressing medical expenditures on income, even controlling for 
imperfect measures of health, leads to a negative bias in the income elasticity. Classical 
measurement error in income might add to this downward bias. One possible reason for the 
larger elasticity at the cross-national level is that such analyses omit differences in 
technology which are correlated with income (higher income countries have better 
technology). This leads to an upwards bias which is likely more severe in studies looking 
at time-series data (as income and technology are increasing simultaneously) (Newhouse, 
1992). There is yet another important difference between cross-sectional and aggregate 
cross-national studies which results from the nature of income changes. If the nature of 
income shocks is transitory, the response is likely to be smaller than if the shock is 
permanent. A permanent income shock raises the value of living longer if the value of life 
is a normal good. Viscusi and Aldy (2003) find that the value of life increases with income 
when performing a meta-analysis of value of life estimates. Hence, the permanent 
responses should be larger than transitory responses as the latter will not lead to a rise in 
the value of life.
9 Essentially, cross-sectional studies involve a mix of evolutionary, 
transitory and permanent income differences while cross-national differences involve to a 
large extent permanent differences in income across countries. Therefore, we will attempt 
                                                 
9 Dustmann and Windmeijer (2000) make a similar point but looking at time allocation jointly with medical 
investment. In that case the transitory wage response can be negative as workers spend less time investing in 
health when their wage rises temporarily while the positive income effect dominates for permanent wage 
changes. They find support for such effects in German panel data.   27 
to replicate an income elasticity to a permanent income change of 10% and a transitory 
(anticipated) change in income. We expect a permanent income elasticity of roughly unity 
while the transitory response should be in line with cross-sectional studies, perhaps larger 
due to absence of measurement error in our simulated data.   
We set the curvature of the health production function to  1 2.1   = . Hence the 
production function is assumed to be less concave than the utility function. We show in 
section 3.5.3 the resulting elasticities. 
3.5.2 Fit of Moments 
In Figure 3, we compare moments of the data with those calculated on simulated data. 
Given the admittedly coarse calibration, the fit is relatively good.  First, mortality is 
relatively close to the HRS data. In particular, we simulate a remaining life-expectancy of 
27.1 years at age 50 while it is 26.6 in the HRS for this group. The progression of mortality 
is very well approximated before age 75 while we under-estimate mortality in the ages 75 
to 90 years old. The simulated average medical expenditure profile tracks the data 
relatively well. We over-estimate expenditures in middle ages and under-estimate at older 
ages. The asset profile follows the hump-shape found in the data and the slow decline after 
retirement. However, we tend to over-estimate assets just before retirement. Finally, the 
simulated retirement pattern captures well the spike at age 62 and the increasing hazard 
beyond age 65. However, it misses the peak at age 65. One reason is that we have assumed 
everyone with insurance at the time of retirement had access to retiree health insurance. 
Hence, those retiring at 62 and 63 do not have an incentive to delay until age 65.    28 
3.5.3 Co-Insurance and Income Elasticities 
Table 2 presents various price (co-insurance rate) and income elasticities from the 
simulation. We report those for 3 different age groups (25-35, 35-45 and 45-55). We focus 
on individuals younger than 55 (few studies of price and income responses exist among the 
elderly). In the first column, we compare total medical expenditures for those insured in 
the baseline scenario with total medical expenditures for the same people in a scenario 
where we increase the co-insurance rate over the entire life-cycle. This yields co-insurance 
elasticites ranging from -0.26 to -0.35 which falls in the range of estimates reported in the 
literature. The elasticity falls with age primarily because medical expenditures become 
more of a necessity with age, hence less elastic. Individuals are generally in better health at 
age 25 such that health expenditures more often take the form of preventive or 
precautionary health investment. These expenditures are more likely to be price sensitive 
since there is a substitute (save until health deteriorates). Results from the HIE show that 
elasticities can be as high as -0.43 for preventive care services.  
In the second column, we report results for a permanent income change of 10%. The 
elasticity estimate is large in the earlier age group (1.56) while just below unity in the older 
age groups (0.88 for 35-45 and 0.909 for those 45-55). Overall, the elasticity is 1.02 at the 
aggregate level. The last column shows that a large component of this response is not due 
to the current change in income but to the fact that the change is permanent. The elasticity 
for a transitory change ranges between 0.5 and 0.65. The permanent income change raises 
the value of life by a large amount in the age group 25-35. We take this as evidence that 
our calibration of the production function is broadly consistent with existing evidence on 
the sensitivity of the demand for health to co-insurance rates and income. 
   29 
4. Simulations  
 
We use the model to look at the relative contribution of various factors to the growth in 
health spending and life expectancy in the last 50 years. According to a recent report by the 
CBO (2008), per capita medical expenditures are roughly 500% larger today than they 
were in 1965 which represents an average growth rate of 3.6% . Figure 4 shows, using data 
from Cutler and Meara (1998), average medical expenditure by age in 2004 relative to 
1963 (adjusted in 2004 dollars using CPI). The largest change is found for the elderly 
(65+). Over this period, there has been an increase in life-expectancy at age 50 of 6 years 
for men (from 22.9 to 28.9 years (6 years)). We investigate whether our model can 
replicate these changes as a result of growth in income, generosity of insurance and 
technological change. 
Newhouse (1992) reviews the reasons behind the increase in health spending. The 
generosity of health insurance has increased over the last 50 years and the price elasticity 
of the demand for health is negative. The average co-insurance rate has fallen from an 
average of 0.6 in the 1960s to 0.2 in 2005 (Newhouse, 1992). On the income side, real 
earnings have increased by 27.3%. Social Security has become more generous, which has 
also raised the income of retirees by an average of 20% for medium and low earners 
(Diamond and Gruber, 1997).
 10  Given the positive income elasticity of demand, this 
should also explain a share of the rise in health spending as argued by Hall and Jones 
(2006). Finally, technological change has lead to large improvements in the treatment of 
several conditions (Deaton, Cutler and Lleras-Muney, 2006) and some have argued 
                                                 
10 Other factors that could explain the rise include population structure (aging), physician induced demand 
and finally lagging factor productivity in the health sector. Newhouse (1992) reviews the evidence on each of 
those and finds little ground for the hypothesis that these explain a large share of what actually happened 
over the period.   30 
(Newhouse, 1992) that the bulk of the increase is due to technological change, which 
increases productivity. There is little evidence on the magnitude of productivity 
improvements. Cutler (2004) looks at cardio-vascular diseases, the leading cause of death 
among men over this period, and concludes that medical advancements explain 2/3 of the 
improvement in mortality over the last half century, the other third likely explained by the 
decrease in smoking among men. Lichtenberg (2003) provides evidence that a large part of 
the gain in life expectancy in recent decades could be attributed to pharmaceutical 
innovation.   
We first implement income and insurance changes at the same time to obtain a 
1965 scenario. This means reducing average earnings by 27%, reducing the generosity of 
social security benefits by 20% and increasing co-insurance rates to 0.6. This should not 
get us to 1965 spending level unless technological change plays a role. We model 
technological change as a scalar that varies the productivity term in equation (8) as a 
function of calendar time s : 
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where  0 s =  refers to 2005 ( 0 1 z = ). We calibrate the change in productivity so that 
matches the level of medical expenditures in 1965.  We find an annual productivity decline 
0.018 z   =    roughly fits the data such that  50 0.4 z = . Table 3 reports a number of 
outcomes in the 1965 and 2005 scenario. The simulated 1965 scenario yields spending 
levels close to those that would be predicted if we used the ratio of 2005 to 1963 spending 
levels (spending is 6 times higher in 2005) produced by CBO. The predicted average 
spending would by $0.697 while we obtain $0.740. The simulated average annual rate of 
increase in health spending is 3% in real terms or 400% total. We simulate that the share of   31 
net income devoted to health spending is 15% in 2003 while it is 3% in 1965. Given minor 
differences in the definition of income (we use net income rather than gross income or 
GNP), this rate of growth is consistent with the data complied by the CBO (4.5% in 1965 
and 14.5% in 2005).  Another important finding is that the age pattern of medical 
expenditures is much flatter in 1965 than in 2005, except at very young ages. Cutler and 
Meara (1998) report data on the age distributions of total medical expenditures from 
National Health Surveys between 1963 and 1987. Although we replicate the much more 
rapid growth in old age (relative to the age 35-45), our simulation also generates high 
growth for those aged 25-34. Cutler and Meara (1998) report very little growth in that age 
group. We take this as suggestive evidence that technological change has been 
concentrated on the older population or on curative rather than preventive care. 
Nevertheless, our calibration of technological change is probably a good first-order 
approximation to the scale of productivity improvements over this period. 
    We simulate that life expectancy at age 50 has grown by 16% between 1965 and 
2005. The relative change from 2005 to 1965 was 25.8% (for all men). Hence, this 
explains roughly 60% of the improvement in life expectancy between 1965 and 2005.  
Note that we do not model other changes in health, such as the reduction in smoking over 
this period. Hence, it is not surprising that we cannot explain the entire gap.  
  We also look at the average retirement age. Interestingly, the average retirement 
age does not change much. However, as we will see next, this is likely the result of the fact 
that the various changes (e.g. income, technology, health insurance copayment) lead to 
cancel out different effects on retirement.    32 
    Next we look at the relative contribution of each of these changes (insurance, 
income and technology) in explaining the rise in spending and life expectancy. We 
sequentially introduce changes starting from the situation in 1965. Results are presented in 
Table 4.  
  As can be seen from the second column of Table 4, increasing the generosity of 
health insurance increases substantially medical expenditures. The average rises from 
$0.742 to $1.725 which represents a change of 132%. The effect is larger among younger 
individuals who we have found are more price sensitive (Table 2). Increasing the 
generosity of health insurance raises the income share of medical expenditures from 3.1% 
to 7.2%. There is no change in the average age of retirement. An important finding is that 
increasing the generosity of health insurance has a very small effect on life expectancy, 
less than 0.3 years. This implies that the additional production of health has little health 
benefit and would not be consumed if individuals had to pay for it. This is consistent with 
the evidence from the HIE that generous insurance had little effect on health outcomes 
within the time frame of the study. 
  Increasing real earnings and the generosity of social security has surprisingly little 
effect on health spending. This is shown in column 3 of Table 4. Total expenditures 
increase by 44% from $0.742 to $1.071. The average change in net income is 16.6%. Part 
of the reason why expenditures do not rise sharply is due to the responsiveness of the 
retirement age to the income change. We find that it reduces the retirement age by 2.4 
years. This effect, along with the progressivity of income taxes, mitigates the income 
effect. Furthermore, the ratio of medical expenditures to income rises only by 1 percentage 
point. Finally, there is a negligible gain in life expectancy of 0.19 years.    33 
  In column 4, we increase productivity at 1.8% a year until 2005. This implies an 
improvement of 150% in productivity over the period. This increases total medical 
expenditures by about as much as they increase with the change in insurance generosity. 
The magnitude of the change is similar across age groups which is most likely the result of 
our assumption that productivity gains were distributed equally over the life-cycle and 
across health status. The average retirement age increases by 1 year, in most part due to the 
fact that individuals can now expect to live 3 more years due to technological 
improvements. Of the three changes (insurance, income and technology), technological 
change is the only one that is capable of generating appreciable gains in life expectancy. 
By itself, it explains roughly half of the increase in life expectancy from 1965 to 2005.  
  None of the scenarios are able to generate health expenditure levels of the 
magnitude witnessed in 2005, even if we sum their relative contribution. For example, 
insurance leads to a 132%, income a 44% and technology a 110% change in spending. This 
sums to 287% , i.e. well under the 464% that we reach when we implement all changes 
together. Hence, we must conclude that there are important interaction effects. This 
exercise would imply these interactions are responsible for a rise of 176% in health care 
spending over the last 50 years.  
  In Figure 4, we show the sources of increase in health spending. Increased 
generosity of health insurance accounts on its own for 29% of the insurance in 
expenditures while income only for 10%. Technological change accounts for 24% of the 
change. But the largest component is the interaction effect, which amounts to 37% of the 
total change.    34 
  As for life expectancy, we report in Figure 5 the sources of the increase as we 
estimate them from the model. Technological change, taking the form of productivity gains 
accounts for the bulk of the increase, 59%. Income and insurance explain a very small 
share of the total increase (4% and 6% respectively). Interaction effects are smaller for life 
expectancy than they are for health spending, amounting to 6%. This leaves a residual 
category of 25% of the total increase in life expectancy. Several candidates are plausible to 
explain the remaining part, one is the reduction in smoking, the second is general 




We calibrate a stochastic life-cycle model of health spending, asset accumulation and 
retirement which allows us to look at the determinants of the rise in health spending and 
longevity over the last 50 years.  We find that with reasonable parameter values, the model 
fits the data relatively well and is able in particular to replicate the income and price 
elasticity of the demand for medical care. We then perform a simulation where we attempt 
to go back to 1965 by simultaneously decreasing the generosity of health insurance and 
income to 1965 levels. We back out the rate of productivity gains necessary to achieve 
1965 spending levels and longevity and find that a rate of 1.8% fits the data relatively well.  
We find that both insurance and technological change independently explain 
respectively 29% and 24% of the total change in health spending and that income explains 
roughly 10%. The remainder, 37%, is due to what we call synergy effects or interactions 
created by simultaneously increasing income, the generosity of health insurance and 
productivity. As for life expectancy, we find that the bulk of the gain is due to productivity   35 
growth while income growth and increased generosity of health insurance explain a 
relatively small fraction of the overall increase (less than 10%).  
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Because some of the state variables are continuous (assets and AIME), we define a bi-
dimensional equally-spaced grid over that space. We select 35 points for assets and 35 
points for AIME. The maximum for assets is set to 300 and the minimum 0. For AIME, the 
minimum is zero and the maximum 6. Since decision rules are likely more non-linear at 
low values of assets and AIME, we set the grid in terms of equally spaced points using the 
square root of assets and AIME (
1/2
t a  and 
1/2
t ae ). We solve for value function at each point 
on that grid starting at terminal age T .  
We have two continuous decision variables. We define a grid for each of these 
decisions (45 points for consumption and 45 for medical expenditures). We select bounds 
of 0 and 25 for medical expenditures (25 is the 99
th percentile in the data) and define the 
grid for consumption in terms next period's assets using the boundary conditions along 
with cash on hand. For consumption, we center the grid around current cash on hand and 
define an equally spaced grid away from that point. We use interpolation to calculate next 
period's value function when the solution for consumption and medical expenditure does 
not fall on the grid given the current state and retirement choice. Since we use an equally-
spaced grid, we use the bi-dimensional cubic spline approximation proposed by 
Habermann and Kindermann (2007). When retirement is an option, we compute the 
optimal solution for each retirement path and compare value functions to calculate 
*( ) t r s . 
The decision rules are generally insensitive to the number of grid points. We solve 
for decision rules using a program written in Ox from OxMetrics (with sub-programs 
written in C++) and the parallel message parsing interface MPICH on a 16 processor core 
cluster with 8 GB of RAM. A typical solution takes roughly 12 minutes.   39 
AIME Approximation 
 
The following table provides age-specific coefficients for the AIME regression. The 
average R-squared is 0.991. For ages above 60, the age 60 coefficients are used. 
 
Table A.1 AIME Approximation Coefficients 
 
 
age earnings>0 log(earnings) log(AIME(t-1)) Constant
26 0.0848 0.1380 0.7425 -0.6538
27 0.0706 0.0793 0.8654 -0.2817
28 0.0713 0.0794 0.8360 -0.3334
29 0.0221 0.0768 0.8792 -0.2243
30 0.0511 0.0578 0.8719 -0.2093
31 0.0072 0.0541 0.9255 -0.1109
32 0.0075 0.0665 0.8884 -0.1772
33 0.0605 0.0447 0.9012 -0.1542
34 0.0104 0.0584 0.8906 -0.1521
35 0.0014 0.0485 0.9140 -0.1015
36 0.0588 0.0208 0.9410 -0.0589
37 0.0513 0.0260 0.9312 -0.0719
38 0.0269 0.0301 0.9430 -0.0575
39 0.0269 0.0208 0.9636 -0.0265
40 0.0166 0.0234 0.9645 -0.0259
41 0.0033 0.0228 0.9777 -0.0128
42 0.0259 0.0225 0.9610 -0.0323
43 0.0158 0.0181 0.9818 -0.0117
44 0.0048 0.0175 0.9871 -0.0013
45 0.0058 0.0146 0.9916 0.0048
46 0.0060 0.0165 0.9874 -0.0036
47 0.0033 0.0185 0.9807 -0.0046
48 0.0047 0.0170 0.9870 -0.0051
49 0.0059 0.0133 0.9912 0.0018
50 0.0056 0.0129 0.9931 0.0008
51 0.0040 0.0119 0.9956 0.0019
52 0.0000 0.0120 0.9964 0.0031
53 0.0163 0.0121 0.9757 -0.0022
54 0.0135 0.0189 0.9567 -0.0080
55 0.0060 0.0123 0.9840 -0.0016
56 0.0056 0.0104 0.9880 0.0004
57 0.0158 0.0076 0.9853 -0.0008
58 0.0134 0.0068 0.9875 0.0006
59 -0.0019 0.0144 0.9674 0.0065
60 -0.0056 0.0176 0.9578 0.0105  40 
 
Price and Income Elasticities  
We demonstrate how the price and income elasticity of demand are related to the concavity 
of the health production function. We add a co-insurance rate (price) to the model used by 
Hall and Jones (2006). Let 1/h  be the mortality rate and h  life expectancy (health 
status). Income y  can be allocated between consumption c  and medical expenditures m . 
Out-of-pocket medical expenditures are given by  m µ  where µ is the  co-insurance rate. 
Health is produced trough a production function  ( ) i m  which is increasing and concave. 
The problem is given by 
 









y = c + µm
h = i(m)  
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 .  The optimality 
condition is  















   
µ
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µ µ     =   + . 
Both  µ    and  y    depend on the curvature of the utility and production functions since they 
involved second derivatives of  ( ) i m  and  ( ) u c . If both utility and production functions are 
of the constant elasticity type, the income and price elasticities are 1 and -1. Alternatively 
as in Hall and Jones, if  0 y   > , for example if the production function exhibits constant 
elasticity while the utility function exhibits decreasing elasticity. In the case we consider 
both utility and production exhibit decreasing elasticity such that the curvature of the 
production function, taking the curvature of the utility function as given, is identified by 
calibrating the price and income elasticities to existing evidence on their magnitude (for 
example, the HIE).  
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Figures 
Figure 1a Employment and Insurance Status 
Notes:.raw data from 1999 to 2005 waves of PSID.  
Figure 1b Health Status  
Notes: raw data from 1999 to 2005 waves of PSID for those younger than 50 and HRS 1992-2004 for those 
older than 50. 
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Figure 2 Moments for Calibration 
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Figure 3 Goodness-Fit of Model Simulations 
 





















   44 
Figure 4 Increase in Health Spending 
 









insurance income productivity interaction
 
Notes:  Based  on  simulation  output  from  Table  4.  Insurance  refers  to  the  induced  change  brought  by an 
increase in the generosity of health insurance keeping income and productivity at the 1965 level. Income 
refers to the induced change brought by the increase in real earnings and the generosity of Social Security 
keeping insurance and productivity at the 1965 level. Productivity refers to the induced change brought by 
improvements in productivity keeping income and insurance at the 1965 level. Finally, interaction refers to the 
residual  induced  change  brought  by  the  interaction  of  income,  insurance  and  productivity  change  when 
occurring simultaneously. 
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Figure 5 Increase in Life Expectancy 
 
 
Notes: Based on simulation output from Table 4. Insurance refers to the induced change brought up by an 
increase in the generosity of health insurance keeping income and productivity at the 1965 level. Income 
refers to the induced change brought by the increase in real earnings and the generosity of Social Security 
keeping insurance and productivity at the 1965 level. Productivity refers to the induced change brought by 
improvements in productivity keeping income and insurance at the 1965 level. Finally, interaction refers to the 
residual  induced  change  brought  by  the  interaction  of  income,  insurance  and  productivity  change  when 
occurring simultaneously. Since the simulated change in life expectancy is less than the observed relative 
share. There is another residual category which captures the unexplained component of the increase in life 




Table 1 Structural Parameters Chosen by Calibration 
 
Parameter  Definition  Value 
    Coefficient of relative risk aversion  2.6 
h     Utility benefit if health status >2  0.035 
0     Baseline log utility benefit of retirement  4.65e-03 
a     Incremental log utility benefit of retirement by age  6.15e-04 
b     Strength of bequest motive  0.05 
00     Baseline log productivity (age 25, good health)  -3.352 
0h     % increment in productivity fair/poor health  1 
0t     % change in productivity with age  0.02 
1     Concavity of production function   2.1 
    Real interest rate  0.03 
    Discount factor  0.95 
Notes: See discussion in section 4.5 for the justification. 
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25-35  -0.345  1.564  0.631 
35-45  -0.281  0.888  0.576 
45-55  -0.267  0.909  0.583 
 
Notes: Simulation based on calibration in Table 1. The first two columns consider permanent changes. In the 
first column, we increase the co-payment from 0.2 to 0.5 across all ages for those insured and look at the 
resulting change in total medical expenditures. In the second column, we increase earnings by 10% over the 
entire working life. The reported elasticity is the average elasticity within the age group. In the last column, we 
increase earnings at the mid point in the age interval (30 for the first, 40 for the second and 50 for the last age 
group).  
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Table 3 Simulated Outcomes in 1965 and 2005 Scenarios 
 
        
  Simulation results 
Outcomes  1965  2005 
Total Medical Expenditures ($k)     
25-35  0.131  1.376 
35-45  0.563  3.210 
45-55  1.020  4.535 
55-65  1.172  5.363 
65-75  1.039  6.149 
75-85  0.740  6.052 
85+  0.945  7.585 
     
Total ($k)  0.742  4.183 
net income ($k)  24.030  28.221 
share of net income  0.031  0.148 
     
Average retirement age (years)  64.2  63.9 
Life expectancy at age 50 (years)  23.88  27.65 
 
Notes: simulated  results in 2005 and 1965 using the insurance, income and technology 
changes. Amounts in thousands of $US 2004. 
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Table 4 Simulated Incremental Changes Starting from 1965 Scenario 
 
                 
  Simulation 









productivity  2005 
Avg. Medical Expenditures($k)           
Age 25-35  0.131  0.397  0.235  0.398  1.376 
35-45  0.563  1.355  0.816  1.201  3.210 
45-55  1.020  2.265  1.418  1.941  4.535 
55-65  1.172  2.538  1.614  2.233  5.363 
65-75  1.039  2.494  1.530  2.198  6.149 
75-85  0.740  1.925  1.197  1.887  6.052 
85+  0.945  2.378  1.620  2.302  7.585 
           
Avg Medical Expenditures($k)  0.742  1.725  1.071  1.563  4.183 
Net income ($k)  24.030  23.991  27.985  23.760  28.221 
Share of net income  0.031  0.072  0.038  0.066  0.148 
           
Average retirement age (years)  64.2  64.3  61.9  65.1  63.9 
Life expectancy at age 50 (years)  23.88  24.16  24.07  26.86  27.65 
Notes: Simulated outcomes. First column represents scenario in 1965. Column 2 to 4 introduce changes one 
at a time starting from 1965. Finally, the last column presents estimates in 2005 (when all changes are 
introduced at once). All amounts in thousands $US 2004. 